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Low-Speed Recovery in Euroland 
by Joachim Benner, Klaus-Jürgen Gern, Carsten-Patrick Meier, 
and Joachim Scheide 
CONTENTS 
  The economic recovery in the euro area lost mo-
mentum in 2004. After a strong increase during 
the first half, real GDP rose at an annual rate of 
less than 1 percent in the following two quarters. 
Overall capacity utilization, which had increased 
in the first half of 2004 for the first time in several 
years, fell once again. While internal demand 
picked up somewhat, the weakening of export 
growth could not be compensated. In the wake of 
the renewed weakness, labor market conditions 
did not improve. Inflation accelerated at the end 
of last year because of the surge in oil prices. 
  High oil prices and the strength of the euro will 
dampen the economic expansion for a while, so 
the recovery will continue to be rather modest 
during the first half of 2005. Later on, the nega-
tive effects will fade, and economic activity will 
accelerate somewhat. We expect real GDP to in-
crease by 1.4 percent in 2005; the unemployment 
rate will remain high.  
Next year, the recovery will gain further momen-
tum also because monetary policy will remain ex-
pansionary; we expect that the ECB will not raise 
key interest rates very soon. Real GDP growth 
will amount to 2.0 percent in 2006, and the unem-
ployment rate will drop to 8.3 percent. Inflation 
will remain slightly below 2 percent in both years. 
  The situation of public finances has deteriorated 
further. In 2004, the aggregated budget deficit 
rose to 2.9 percent of GDP, compared to 2.7 per-
cent last year. In addition to Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, and Greece, the deficit ratio probably 
exceeded the 3 percent margin also in Portugal. 
Several governments will apparently not con-
solidate their budgets as intended by the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP). In the recently published 
Stability Programs, the budgets of several large 
countries are not projected to be balanced until 
2008, even though growth assumptions appear 
very optimistic.  
  In March this year, the European governments 
and the European Commission decided on changes 
in the implementation of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. They imply that budget deficits will be 
higher in the future and that the debt-to-GDP 
ratios will continue to rise. One reason for this is 
that countries can now claim special circumstan-
ces, which means that a deficit ratio above 3 per-
cent will not automatically be called excessive. 
Furthermore, countries with high deficits should 
consolidate their budgets mainly in good times, 
which are defined as years in which the output 
gap is positive. And they are given more time 
than before to take corrective actions. All in all, 
the sustainability of public finances will deterio-
rate. The main target of the SGP—to balance the 
budgets in the medium term and to reduce gov-
ernment debt to below 60 percent of GDP at a 
satisfactory pace—will not be achieved. 
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Low-Speed Recovery in Euroland 
The economic recovery in the euro area lost con-
siderable momentum in 2004. After a strong in-
crease in the first half of the year, real GDP rose 
at an annual rate of less than 1 percent in the 
following two quarters. Overall capacity utiliza-
tion, which previously had increased for the first 
time in several years, fell once again. The main 
reason for this was that export growth deceler-
ated as a consequence of the slowdown in the 
world economy and the appreciation of the euro. 
Though domestic demand picked up somewhat, 
it was not strong enough to compensate for 
weaker exports. Fixed investment could recover 
after a prolonged period of weakness; however, 
private consumption rose only modestly. Against 
the background of the economic slowdown, un-
employment stayed high. Consumer prices 
picked up considerably near the end of 2004 be-
cause of the surge in oil prices; in the first two 
months of this year, the inflation rate amounted 
to slightly less than 2 percent. 
All in all, economic expansion has been very 
sluggish in recent years. In addition, the econ-
omy has very often been affected by shocks, so 
that a recovery has repeatedly been interrupted 
after a short period of time. To be sure, no coun-
try is isolated from influences from abroad or 
from shocks stemming from sharp increases in 
important raw material prices, but the weakness 
of domestic demand which has been observed 
for several years is a major challenge to eco-
nomic policy. This, however, pertains only to a 
few countries, especially Germany. According to 
our estimates, potential output growth has 
slowed considerably to 1 percent in Germany in 
recent years, whereas this rate has remained 
roughly constant in the rest of the euro area, 
amounting to 2 ¼ percent (Benner et al. 2004). 
This implies that real GDP in the euro area can-
not be expected to grow by more than 2 percent 
over an extended period of time. 
In the near future, economic activity will be 
dampened by the high oil price and the negative 
effects stemming from the appreciation of the 
euro. Therefore, the recovery will be rather 
modest in the first half of this year. This forecast 
is supported by the confidence indicators, which 
have recently deteriorated; they can be quite 
successfully used for a short-term forecast (see 
Appendix). In the later course of this year, the 
dampening factors will fade so that the recovery 
will accelerate somewhat. This tendency is ex-
pected to continue next year. 
This forecast implies for monetary policy that 
the ECB will not tighten monetary policy very 
soon. The recent economic data have also been a 
negative surprise for the central bank. At the be-
ginning of March, the ECB therefore lowered its 
forecast for real GDP in the euro area; in addi-
tion, the immediate risks to price level stability 
have become a little less important. However, if 
there is no increase in key interest rates, the 
period of low rates, which has also led to a sub-
stantial increase in liquidity, will be prolonged. 
This will raise the risks to stability in the me-
dium term. While this fact alone would imply 
that rates should be raised very soon, the moder-
ate speed of the recovery will probably prevent 
an early tightening by the ECB. An increase can 
therefore be expected only for 2006 when the re-
covery will have strengthened. 
Many governments have continued to pursue 
an unsound fiscal policy. Especially against the 
background that the budgets have not been con-
solidated as fast as originally intended, the rules 
and the targets of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) have recently been changed. However, 
the new elements are not useful in returning to a 
credible and a sound fiscal policy—quite the op-
posite is true: It is now even less likely that the 
main target of the SGP, namely a balanced 
budget, will be achieved; instead, budget deficits 
will remain high in the foreseeable future, and 
government debt in relation to GDP will con-
tinue to rise. One additional reason for this out-
look is the fact that many governments are once 
again overly optimistic about economic growth 
in the future, so they will probably consolidate 
less than would be necessary to reduce budget 
deficits as intended.  4 
1  In the Doldrums Again 
Economic activity in the euro area has slowed 
down since summer 2004. In the second half of 
last year, real GDP merely increased at an annu-
alized rate of 0.8 percent, after having expanded 
at a healthy rate in the first half (Figure 1). For 
the year as a whole, real GDP grew by 2.0 per-
cent.1 So the increase in production corresponds 
approximately to trend growth, which we esti-
mate at 1.8 percent.2 
The pace of expansion differed considerably 
across the individual member states. While in-
dustrial production in France and Spain ex-
panded strongly, expansion in Germany, Italy, 
and the Netherlands was weak.3 A potential 
cause for this difference is the development on 
the housing markets. In France and Spain, 
strongly increasing housing prices supported 
domestic demand: On the one hand residential 
investment expanded, on the other hand increas-
ing wealth of the private households stimulated 
consumption. In contrast, the housing markets in 
Germany and also in the Netherlands weakened. 
The sluggish growth of economic activity af-
ter the middle of the year was mainly due to a 
turnaround of foreign demand. After exports had 
increased strongly during the first half of 2004, 
they expanded much slower than imports in the 
second half. This reflects the dampening effects 
of the preceding appreciation of the euro. Private 
consumption increased only slightly in the sec-
ond half of the year. The consumer confidence 
indicator published by the European Commis-
sion suggests that households are in depressed 
mood. This may be due to the strained labor 
marked conditions and uncertainty about up-
coming structural labor market reforms. Corpo-
rate investment has improved after it was re-
strained in the first half of 2004. However, in-
dustrial confidence deteriorated even though in-
dustrial new orders rose. 
____________________ 
1 This includes the working-day effect, which accounts for 
0.2 percentage points of real GDP growth. 
2 For a detailed analysis of the potential output in the euro 
area, see also Benner et al. (2004). 
3  For Germany, the working-day effect accounts for 0.6 
percentage points of real GDP growth. 
The situation on the labor market has hardly 
changed. The number of employed persons in 
the total economy has increased moderately; 
while employment in the industrial sector has 
contracted, employment in the service sector has 
expanded. The unemployment rate has almost 
stagnated; most recently it has amounted to 8.8 
percent. The increase in consumer prices accel-
erated in the course of 2004. The Harmonized 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) rose at an an-
nualized rate of 2.5 percent in seasonally ad-
justed terms. Last year on average, the HICP in-
creased by 2.1 percent mainly due to the strong 
rise in energy prices. The core inflation rate in-
creased on average by 1.9 percent. Since the be-
ginning of 2005 the acceleration in prices has 
leveled out; in February the year-over-year in-
flation rate was 2.0 percent, the core inflation 
rate amounted to 1.6 percent. 
2  Fiscal Policy: High Deficits 
Persist 
In 2004 the aggregated budget in the euro area 
exhibited a deficit of 2.9 percent in relation to 
GDP, following 2.7 percent in the previous year 
(Table 1). Besides Germany, France, the Nether-
lands, and Greece also Portugal may exceed the 
3 percent laid down in the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP). According to our own estimates as 
well as those of the OECD (2004b), economy-
wide capacity utilization remained nearly un-
changed in 2004; thus the increase in the actual 
deficit was not cyclical. Therefore, fiscal policy 
in the euro area as a whole was on a slightly 
expansive course. 
In the course of next year, the structural defi-
cit is expected to decline somewhat. This is 
mainly due to special measures, which like those 
in the case of Germany imply that the fiscal bur-
den in the future will rise (Benner et al. 2005). 
Against the background of a more favorable cy-
clical development, the budget deficit will de-
cline slightly in 2006. Structural deficits will 
remain largely unchanged. 5 
Figure 1: 
Business Cycle Indicatorsa for Euroland, 2002–2005 
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aSeasonally adjusted. — bAt constant prices. — cAnnualized percentage change over previous quarter. — dIndustry 
excluding construction. — ePercentage change over previous year.  
Source: EUROFRAME (2005); Eurostat (2005); ECB (2005b). 
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Table 1: 
Indicators of Fiscal Positions in Euroland, 2003–2006 (percent of nominal GDP) 
  Gross public sector debt  General government budget balance 
 2003  2004a 2005b 2006b 2003 2004a 2005b 2006b 
Germany  64.2 66.0 67.9 69.2 –3.8 –3.7 –3.5 –3.2 
France  63.7 65.6 67.5 68.0 –4.1 –3.7 –3.3 –2.9 
Italy  106.2 105.8 105.0 104.5 –2.4 –3.0 –3.5 –3.6 
Spain  51.4 48.9 46.5 43.5  0.4 –0.8 –0.1  0.0 
Netherlands  54.1 55.5 56.8 56.5 –3.2 –3.1 –2.8 –2.3 
Belgium  100.0 94.0 90.0 85.5  0.4  0.0 –0.5 –0.3 
Austria  64.5 62.5 61.0 60.0 –1.1 –1.4 –2.0 –2.0 
Finland  45.6 47.0 48.5 49.8 2.3 2.0 1.7 2.0 
Greece  109.9 110.0 108.5 106.3  –4.6  –5.9  –4.1  –3.5 
Portugal  60.3 61.5 62.2 62.8 –2.8 –3.2 –3.3 –3.4 
Ireland  32.1 28.6 26.2 24.0  0.1  0.0 –0.9 –0.5 
Luxembourg  5.3 7.0 7.5 8.0  0.8 –1.5 –1.0 –0.6 
Euroland  70.7 71.1 71.6 71.4 –2.7 –2.9 –2.8 –2.5 
aPartly estimated. — bForecast. 
Source: Eurostat (2005); own calculations and forecasts. 
Table 2: 
Key Figures of the Updated Stability Programsa, 2004 and 2008 
 GDP  growthb  General government 
budget balancec 





2004d 2008 2004d 2008 2004d 2008   2004d 2008   
Germany 0.5  1.9  –3.8  –1.5  65.5 65.0 47.5 43.5 40.0 39.0 
France 1.3  2.5  –3.6  –0.9  64.8 62.0 54.0 51.7 50.4 50.7 
Italy 0.6  2.2  –2.9  –0.9  106.0 98.0 47.3 46.2 45.1 44.0 
Spanien 2.5  3.0  –0.8  0.4  49.1 40.0 40.6 39.8 39.9 40.2 
Netherlandse 0.3  2.2  –3.0  –1.9  56.3  58.3 48.0 46.0 45.0 44.1 
Belgium 1.6  2.3  0.0  0.6  96.6 84.2 49.6 48.5 49.6 49.1 
Austria 1.4  2.4  –1.3  0.0  64.2 59.1 50.0 45.8 48.7 45.8 
Finland 2.6  2.4  2.0  2.0  44.6 41.1 48.5 48.5 50.5 50.5 
Greece 4.0  4.0  –5.3  –2.5  112.1 102.5  48.5  46.3  43.2  43.8 
Portugale 0.1  2.6  –2.8  –1.8  62.0  61.4 48.0 44.6 45.2 42.8 
Irelande 4.8  5.2  0.1  –0.6  30.5  30.0 34.3 33.8 35.2 33.2 
Luxembourge 2.9  3.8  –1.4  –1.0  5.0  4.5 44.8 45.7 43.4 44.7 
Eurolandf 1.2  2.4  –2.8  –0.9  71.1  67.2 47.5 45.0 43.7 42.9 
aSome Stability Programs include alternative scenarios concerning the GDP growth. This table reflects the basic scenario. —
bAverage annual growth rate. Partly estimated. — cPercent of GDP. — dFigures for 2004 are taken from the Stability 
Programs. — eProjections until 2007 only. — fAverage for the countries above.  
Source: Stability Programs; own calculations and estimates. 
It seems that most governments do not intend 
to pursue a policy of sustained budget consoli-
dation. In the updated Stability and Convergence 
Programs, especially the bigger countries do not 
aim at a balanced budget until 2008 anymore 
(Table 2). Moreover, economic growth is as-
sumed to be significantly above trend in many 
cases. The projections for output growth, espe-
cially in the countries with high deficits, are up 
to more than twice as high as the growth in 7 
the  previous four years. For Germany, a GDP 
growth of 1.9 on average for the years 2005–
2008 is supposed. Given our calculation of po-
tential growth of 1 percent this seems to be un-
realistically high. Also in the past, GDP growth 
assumptions in the Stability and Convergence 
Programs proved to be overly optimistic. In 
other countries, too, growth forecasts are on the 
high side so that it seems likely that additional 
measures will be necessary in order to achieve 
the budget targets. 
3  The “Reform” of the Stability 
and Growth Pact:  
Less Sustainable Fiscal Policies 
In the middle of March, the European govern-
ments and the European Commission discussed 
changes in the SGP. Apparently, in recent years 
the Pact has not worked as desired. For example, 
Germany and also more and more other coun-
tries have had high budget deficits, often reach-
ing some 3 percent relative to GDP even when 
adjusted for the cycle. In addition, it was not 
feasible to force governments for a change in 
their policies, because the governments them-
selves decided how the excessive-deficit proce-
dures should be handled. While the Pact seemed 
to fail in leading to sound fiscal policies, gov-
ernments nevertheless agreed that it should be 
maintained in principle. In the Report to the 
European Council entitled “Improving the Im-
plementation of the Stability and Growth Pact” 
(in the following: Council Report), the changes 
in the SGP are described. 
It is desirable to have clearly defined rules 
in    terms of budget surveillance. Governments 
should be urged to change their fiscal policies 
without the consent of the Ecofin Council if their 
policies have become unsound. This would im-
ply that the role of the European Commission is 
to be strengthened, because it is against the idea 
of the Stability and Growth Pact that the gov-
ernments themselves decide whether a procedure 
against one country should be continued or not, 
as they did in November 2003.4 Instead, it 
should be the rule that a warning is issued ac-
cording to pre-announced criteria and that the 
sanction mechanisms should then also be im-
plemented automatically. However, such changes 
in the rules were not implemented according to 
the Council Report. Obviously, governments 
are  not willing to give so much power to the 
European Commission or—as is sometimes sug-
gested—an independent group of economic 
experts. 
Furthermore, there is a number of changes 
which imply a greater “flexibility” of the targets 
of the SGP. They imply that a deficit ratio of 
more than 3 percent should not automatically 
be defined as excessive; instead, there are now 
more exceptions—in addition to those already 
mentioned in the Pact—and countries will have 
more time for correcting the high deficits. In the 
following, we are going to discuss those changes 
which make budget consolidation dependent on 
the state of the business cycle and which define 
special circumstances which allow higher defi-
cits. We conclude with remarks on the size of 
government debt, which is crucial for the issue 
of fiscal sustainability. 
3.1  Budget Deficits Will Be Higher 
The Council Report makes clear that the refer-
ence values of the SGP—a 3 percent deficit ratio 
and a 60 percent debt ratio—remain unchanged; 
also, the medium-term objective remains a 
budget in balance or in surplus. These statements 
are certainly useful as they are in line with the 
original intention of the SGP. However, there are 
now several modifications which raise doubts 
whether “… the need to reduce government debt 
to below 60 percent of GDP at a satisfactory 
pace …” (Council Report: 16) can be met in 
reality.5 
According to the Council Report, budget con-
solidation efforts shall take account of cyclical 
conditions. The structural budget deficits should 
____________________ 
4 Very early in the discussion, this point was recognized as 
a major shortcoming of the rules of the SGP. See t he 
analysis by Scheide and Solveen (1997). 
5 See also the comments in EUROFRAME (2005). 8 
be more strongly reduced in good times, whereas 
they may remain unchanged or may be reduced 
only slightly in bad times. In the Council Report, 
“good times” are defined as “periods where out-
put exceeds its potential level” (Council Report: 
11), i.e., when there is a positive output gap.6 
Therefore, the periods in which a reduction of 
the structural deficit is seen as appropriate are 
very limited. For example, the countries with ex-
cessive deficits can claim that actual output in 
the years 2001–2004 was lower than potential 
output, so that budget consolidation should not 
have taken place; the same will apply to 2005 
and probably to 2006. This seems to justify ex 
post the actual increase in structural budget defi-
cits in recent years. Even in the mentioned “good 
times,” the deficit should be reduced by only 0.5 
percent of GDP, which is given as a benchmark 
in the Council Report. Against the background 
that structural deficits in a few member states are 
close to—or even above—3 percent of GDP, this 
implies that the (still valid) medium-term objec-
tive of budgets close to balance or in surplus will 
not be reached in the foreseeable future, as this 
would require many years of consolidation. The 
target of a balanced budget can only be achieved 
if the structural budget deficits are reduced con-
siderably every year in a pre-announced way, 
and that this course should not be made de-
pendent on the state of the business cycle. In-
stead, the budgets should be balanced in the near 
future according to the rules of the SGP. 
There are also other reasons why the cycle-
oriented strategy proposed in the Council Report 
may not lead to the desired outcome. First, it re-
quires a commonly agreed estimate of potential 
output; however, estimates on this crucial vari-
able differ considerably. For example, the Ger-
man government still assumes that the growth 
rate is relatively high. According to this as-
sumption, real GDP has to grow by more than 2 
percent for a number of years until the output 
gap becomes positive. If this assumption is too 
optimistic, budget consolidation would not be 
achieved. Second, a consolidation which de-
____________________ 
6 The criticism also applies—although to a lesser extent—
to the case when “good times” are defined as periods in 
which actual GDP growth is higher than the growth rate of 
output potential, i.e., when the negative output gap declines. 
pends on the cyclical situation requires that fis-
cal policy is sufficiently flexible. However, the 
legislative process can be very time-consuming 
so that a quick response to a “good year” in 
terms of the business cycle may not be possible. 
This is also one of the reasons why many 
economists are not in favor of “fine tuning” by 
fiscal policy measures (see, e.g., Taylor 2000). 
In addition, experience shows that such a strat-
egy of rapid consolidation in “good times” has 
not worked in the past, although it was agreed 
upon by the member states. For example, many 
governments did not reduce the structural defi-
cits in the boom year 2000. 
Another modification in the Council Report 
implies that each country can claim that special 
expenditures are necessary so that budget defi-
cits above 3 percent in relation to GDP would 
not automatically be qualified as excessive. In 
the context of the so-called “other relevant fac-
tors” (Council Report: 15), “special considera-
tion” will be given to efforts related to “fostering 
international solidarity … the unification of 
Europe …” and so on. This implies that a budget 
deficit can be higher because of special circum-
stances. As a consequence, government debt will 
also be higher, because it can hardly be expected 
that a country would keep the deficit lower than 
otherwise if circumstances are favorable. The 
same holds for measures which improve eco-
nomic growth; for example, this is supposed to 
apply to public investment or to measures of 
structural reforms. The rule is not transparent, as 
these factors are not clearly defined and can 
therefore be subject to different interpretations. 
According to the German government, such 
factors include the costs of German unification. 
However, these costs are not at all the reason 
why the German budget deficit has exceeded 3 
percent of GDP in recent years. All in all, con-
sidering special circumstances will lead to 
higher deficits and will make public finances 
less sustainable.  
The same consequence, namely higher defi-
cits, follows from the change in the initial dead-
line for correcting the excessive deficit (Council 
Report: 18). In “case of special circumstances,” 
the deadline for correcting an excessive deficit 
can be set one year later. Sanctions are therefore 9 
even less likely than under the old rules. In ef-
fect, the deficits are allowed to be higher than 
under the “old rules” of the SGP. 
3.2  Sustainability Is the Key 
The most important question related to the SGP 
reform is whether fiscal policies will become 
more sustainable in the future. For this, the debt-
to-GDP ratio is the relevant reference, because 
sustainability depends—given the growth rate of 
potential output and the real rate of interest—on 
this ratio (see, e.g., Boss and Lorz 1995). In gen-
eral, fiscal policy can still be sustainable if there 
is a budget deficit on average over the cycle. The 
size of the deficit at which the debt-to-GDP ratio 
is stabilized depends among other things on the 
medium-term growth rate of nominal GDP. Ac-
cordingly, the deficit in Ireland can be a lot 
higher because of the high growth rate of poten-
tial output, whereas it is much lower in Germany 
with a relatively low growth rate.7 Although 
there is no consensus in the economic literature 
whether the ratio of 60 percent can be seen as 
optimal, even critics of the Pact accept that 60 
percent is a useful reference.8 In some countries 
where fiscal policy is oriented at a debt-to-GDP 
ratio, the value is even lower; for example, in the 
United Kingdom it is 40 percent of GDP. 
When the SGP was implemented, the target 
was to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio in the euro 
area; at that time, it amounted to around 70 per-
cent, the same level as today. In order to reach 
the target, the government budgets were to be 
balanced on average over the cycle. Another 
reason for the balanced budget was that the im-
plicit debt which is due to unfounded liabilities 
of the government was very high. It is still high 
today and in some countries even increasing. For 
example, the implicit debt in Germany was 270 
percent in relation to GDP in the year 2002 
(Sachverständigenrat 2003: 276). This debt re-
____________________ 
7 This makes clear that the reasoning in terms of the debt 
ratio is not symmetric: While the ratio is mentioned as a 
reference for those countries which currently have a 
problem with high deficits, it is apparently not applied to 
countries with a high growth rate and which could therefore 
run budget deficits much higher than 3 percent of GDP.  
8 See, for example, the analysis by Wyplosz (2005). 
sults from the liabilities in the pay-as-you-go 
systems of social insurance. 
In the past few years, the (explicit) debt has 
increased in several euro area countries, espe-
cially in those with a high or excessive deficit. In 
France and Germany, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
amounted to about 65 percent. In Italy, a country 
with a traditionally high debt, the ratio has 
hardly been reduced in recent years; in 2004, it 
amounted to about 106 percent, although the tar-
get was to reduce it relatively quickly to 60 per-
cent. When the debt-to-GDP ratio is taken as a 
reference for fiscal policy, the problem countries 
will have to take substantial measures to reduce 
government debt relative to GDP. This would 
imply that budget deficits would have to be re-
duced considerably: the same recommendation 
follows from the current procedures of the SGP 
in connection with excessive deficits in order to 
secure the sustainability of public finances. 
If the debt ratio is applied, the fiscal policy of 
several governments in recent years cannot be 
considered as sustainable. A budget deficit of 3 
percent relative to GDP in normal times—i.e. a 
few countries have a structural deficit of this 
size—is not in conformity with the SGP, no 
matter whether the deficit or the debt ratio is 
used as reference. If, for example, the deficit in 
Germany remained at this level, the steady state 
level for the debt ratio would be over 100 per-
cent in relation to GDP, given the outlook for 
nominal GDP growth in the medium term.9 The 
probability that this will happen is even higher 
when budget consolidation is postponed again 
and again, because the government still assumes 
that there will be a strong upswing with growth 
rates of 2 percent or more for several years. The 
consequences of such a lax fiscal policy could be 
dramatic: If there are doubts concerning the 
____________________ 
9  A deficit ratio of 3 percent is given as a benchmark, 
because it implies that the debt-to-GDP ratio would then 
converge to 60 percent; the underlying assumption is that 
the growth rate of potential nominal GDP is 5 percent per 
annum. Such a high rate, however, is completely unrealistic 
for Germany even when the most optimistic estimates of 
potential output growth are considered; according to our 
estimate it is less than 3 percent. Also for the euro area as a 
whole, the estimate has to be corrected: the medium-term 
growth rate of nominal GDP is probably no more than 4 
percent. This implies that the reference value for the budget 
deficit should actually be reduced. 10 
sustainability of public finances, the risk pre-
mium on interest rates for government bonds 
would increase. In order to prevent such an in-
crease, drastic actions may be necessary, either 
drastic cuts of government expenditures or 
drastic increases in taxes would be the likely 
outcome. This would not only reduce the welfare 
of citizens, it would also undermine the credi-
bility of governments. In such a scenario, the 
pressure on the central bank would also increase 
substantially, as governments would urge the 
ECB to pursue an inflationary monetary policy. 
All in all, the recent softening of the SGP 
poses a risk for macroeconomic stability in the 
European Union. The risk that budget deficits 
will be higher and that fiscal policy will become 
less sustainable in the future has increased. The 
recent modifications of the SGP allow budget 
deficits to be higher than originally intended or 
to remain high for a longer period of time. 
Therefore, it is likely that the debt-to-GDP ratio 
which in 2004 was already higher than 70 per-
cent for the euro area as a whole will not come 
down sufficiently in the coming years.  
There is a problem of enforcing rules, which 
is a common problem for economic policy and 
which is intensively discussed in the economic 
literature. The experience with the SGP in recent 
years is a demonstration of this problem. In our 
view, the failure of the SGP to produce the de-
sired sound fiscal policy was not due to wrong 
targets but rather due to the fact that several 
governments have not pursued a strict course 
of  budget consolidation—contrary to their re-
peated statements in various documents (see also 
Deutsche Bundesbank 2004). Now that the rules 
have been made softer, it is uncertain whether 
governments are more willing to stick to their 
commitments.  
4  Monetary Policy Will Remain 
Expansionary 
Monetary conditions have improved slightly in 
recent months. Since June 2003, key interest 
rates have remained unchanged, the minimum 
bid rate on the main refinancing operations of 
the Eurosystem having been at 2.0 percent. 
Money market rates (3-month EURIBOR) were 
only slightly higher at the beginning of March 
2005; apparently, markets do not expect that in-
terest rates will be raised very soon. Judged by 
real interest rates, the ECB continues to be on an 
expansionary course. If nominal rates are ad-
justed for core inflation, the real rate is close to 
zero, i.e., well below the long-term average of 
2.5 percent. Long-term rates have come down 
worldwide in recent months. In the euro area, the 
yield on 10-year government bonds was 3.6 per-
cent at the beginning of March and thus close to 
their historical lows they had reached in early 
1999 and early 2003 (Figure 2). 
One reason for the low level of interest rates 
seems to be the ample liquidity which has been 
created in the course of the low interest rate 
policy.10 The recent decline probably also re-
flects the weakening of economic activity in the 
euro area expected for the near future. In real 
terms, the long-term rates have remained well 
below their historical average; this is true when 
rates are adjusted either with the core rate of in-
flation or with inflationary expectations. For 
more than one year, markets have expected an 
inflation rate of more than 2 percent for the euro 
area. Money growth has accelerated in recent 
months; M3 went up by a little more than 6 per-
cent at the beginning of 2005. Also credit growth 
has accelerated. Finally, the financing conditions 
for firms have improved in the wake of the price 
increases on stock markets. 
While all these factors have led to a slight im-
provement of monetary conditions, they have 
deteriorated somewhat because of the appre-
ciation of the euro. The euro has advanced 
against all major currencies, in particular against 
the US dollar. However, the gains did not con-
tinue during the first months of this year. In the 
past 12 months, the euro appreciated against the 
dollar by about 5 percent. In real effective terms, 
the currency gained only 2 percent. The com-
petitiveness of European exporters has deterio-
rated only modestly so that the impact on output 
and inflation will be rather limited this year. 
____________________ 
10 For an analysis on the low level of real interest rates in 
the world, see also Benner et al. (2005). 11 
Figure 2:  
Indicators of Monetary Policy in Euroland, 1980–2005 
 




























































Short-Term Interest Rates  Long-Term Interest Rates 
Yield Spreadb  US Dollar/Euro Exchange Ratec 
Money Stock M1a  Money Stock M3a
 
aPercentage change over previous year. — bLong-term interest rate minus short-term interest rate. — cBefore 1999: 
US dollar/ecu exchange rate. 
Source: ECB (2005b). 
The expansionary course of monetary policy 
is not only reflected in the low level of the real 
interest rate; also, interest rates have been low if 
they are compared to the Taylor interest rate. 
This rate is calculated quite differently in the lit-
erature. First, there are many Taylor rules dif-
fering, for example, in terms of the variables 
used and the coefficients for the reaction of the 
central bank to the inflation gap and the output 
gap. Also, there are many different estimates for 12 
the variables entering the equation, i.e., the 
growth rate of potential output and the equilib-
rium real interest rate. Given the Taylor equation 
in its original version (Taylor 1993)11 the uncer-
tainty of the inputs is reduced to these two vari-
ables. Table 3 summarizes the calculations using 
three different methods. For the equilibrium real 
interest rate we assume on the basis of theo-
retical considerations that it should equal the 
growth rate of potential output. This means, the 
lower the growth rate is, the lower the real inter-
est rate is. While this would lead to a relatively 
low Taylor rate, a low growth rate of potential 
output also implies a lower negative output gap 
leading to a higher Taylor rate. As a consequence 
of these two effects, the three methods of cal-
culating the Taylor rate lead to very similar re-
sults: In 2004, the money market rate should 
have been between 3.2 and 3.5 percent, while the 
actual rate was 2.1 percent (Figure 3). All in all, 
the statement that the interest rate is low is rela-
tively independent of the method used. 
This also holds for the neutral rate of interest 
for which the calculations come to very similar 
results. This interest rate should prevail if the in-
flation target is met and if the output gap is zero. 
According to the three estimates, the rate should 
be between 3.2 and 3.7 percent. During the first 
half of 2004, the Taylor rate increased slightly 
because the rate of capacity utilization went up. 
For some time, the Taylor rate has been more 
than 100 basis points higher than the actual in-
terest rate. 
The fact that short-term interest rates have re-
mained very low has been one reason for the 
ECB to prepare the markets for a rate hike. This 
seems appropriate also because the reasons for 
the low interest rate policy are no longer given. 
In addition, the ECB has repeatedly stated that 
there are upside risks for price level stability also 
____________________ 
11 The following equation is used here as in our previous 
analyses: 
(1)  () () * 5 . 0 * 5 . 0 y y r i − + − + + = π π π , 
where i is the short-term interest rate, r is the equilibrium 
real rate, π is actual inflation, π* is the inflation target, y is 
real GDP, and y* is potential output. We assume an in-
flation target of 1.75 percent, which is in line with the 
ECB’s notion (“below, but close to 2 percent”). Further-
more, we use the core rate of inflation (HICP without 
energy and unprocessed food). 
because of the ample liquidity in the euro area.12 
However, key rates will probably not be raised 
very soon because the immediate risks to price 
level stability are small, given, among other 
things, the moderate increase in wages in the 
euro area. In addition, economic activity is un-
expectedly sluggish and will accelerate only in 
the later course of this year. Therefore, we as-
sume that the ECB will keep rates unchanged for 
this year. There will be a moderate tightening of 
monetary policy next year; we expect the main 
refinancing rate to reach 2.5 percent by the end 
of 2006. For this outlook it is assumed that 
the monetary overhang will not lead to a much 
stronger acceleration of nominal GDP growth. If 
this happened, the ECB would have to raise rates 
faster given its mandate to secure price level 
stability. 
5  Modest Wage Inflation 
Over the past year, the rate of wage increases 
continued to decline on a euro area level, ex-
tending the trend towards lower wage rises, 
which has been prevalent since early 2003. In 
the second half of 2004, the year-on-year rate of 
change in the compensation of employees even 
dropped quite substantially, from 2.2 percent in 
the second quarter to only 1.5 percent in the third 
quarter. This deceleration of wage inflation, how-
ever, was mainly due to a special factor related 
to the timing of wage payments in the Italian 
public sector (ECB 2005a: 38). The rise of other 
wage cost indicators also slowed down signifi-
cantly. Growth of negotiated wages has decreased 
to slightly less than 2 percent, down by nearly 
1 percentage point since the second half of 2002. 
In addition, increases in hours worked were not 
fully compensated; hourly wage costs have risen 
at a slower rate than monthly gross wages for 
some time now. This contrasts with an opposite 
tendency that prevailed in the years 1999–2002, 
in large part due to the introduction of the 35-
hour work week in France. 
____________________ 
12 “… there remains significantly more liquidity in the euro 
area than is required to finance non-inflationary growth” 
(ECB 2005a: 5). 13 
Table 3: 
Calculation of the Taylor Rate and the Neutral Interest Rate in Euroland 2004a 
Method Potential  growth 
(= ˆ  real rate) 
Output gap  Taylor rate Neutral  rate 
OECD estimate  1.9  –1.6  3.2  3.7 
HP filter  1.4  –0.3  3.5  3.2 
IfW estimate  1.8  –1.3  3.4  3.6 
aThe inflation target is assumed to be 1.75 percent. 
Source: OECD (2004b); own estimates and calculations. 
Figure 3: 
Short-term Interest Rate and Taylor Rate in Euroland, 1999–2004a 
Percent 










aThe Taylor rate is calculated for the HICP excluding energy, food, alcohol, and tobacco. The calculations are based on the 
assumption of an inflation target of 1.75 percent and on the assumption of an equilibrium real interest rate to be equal to the 
growth rate of potential output, estimated with a Hodrick–Prescott filter. 
Source: Eurostat (2005); ECB (2005b); own calculations and estimates. 
Recent wage contracts indicate that the loss in 
purchasing power associated with the rise in oil 
prices will be tolerated. Demands for higher 
wage increases have been checked by the con-
tinued sluggishness in the euro area labor mar-
ket. In a number of countries even a deceleration 
of wage growth in the current year can be ex-
pected (Table 4). This means that real compen-
sation per employee will hardly rise. Given that 
reductions in income taxes and social security 
contributions implemented this year will not be 
significant on aggregate, real disposable income 
per employee will increase only slightly at best. 
At the same time, however, this wage develop-
ment supports employment growth, since in 
combination with a cyclical improvement in 
productivity growth real unit labor costs are ex-
pected to decline considerably this year and 
next. In addition, the sustained wage moderation 
allows the ECB to keep key interest rates at low  14 
Table 4: 
Wage Increasesa in Euroland, 2002–2006 (percentage change over previous year) 
 2002  2003  2004b 2005b 2006b 
Germany  1.5 1.6 0.1 0.7 1.0 
France  2.4 2.3 3.0 2.7 2.3 
Italy  2.5 3.8 3.0 2.4 2.5 
Spain  4.2 4.2 3.7 3.7 3.4 
Netherlands  6.2 3.9 2.5 0.5 1.5 
Portugal  4.4 4.1 3.0 2.7 2.5 
Austria  1.7 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Belgium  3.7 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.5 
Greece  9.2 4.0 6.5 5.0 4.5 
Finland  1.9 3.3 4.0 3.5 3.5 
Ireland  5.0 4.7 5.0 4.5 4.5 
Luxembourg  3.7 2.1 3.3 3.0 3.0 
aCompensation of employees per worker. — bForecast. 
Source: European Commission (2004); own forecasts. 
Table 5: 
Compensation of Employees, Productivity, and Unit Labor Costs in Euroland, 2002–2006 (percentage change 
over previous year) 
 2002  2003  2004a 2005b 2006b 
Compensation of 











Productivityc  0.4 0.4 1.7 1.2 1.4 
Unit  labor  costs  2.1 1.9 0.3 0.7 0.5 
aPartly estimated. — bForecast. — cReal GDP per worker. 
Source: ECB (2005b); own calculations and forecasts. 
levels. Inflationary pressure from the wage front 
is not in sight also further down the road, as a 
pickup in wage growth next year is unlikely 
given an only moderate acceleration of output 
growth, capacity utilization remaining at rela-
tively low levels, and an increasing competition 
on the labor market in important countries. Thus, 
with nominal unit labor costs rising at rates be-
ing considerably below 2 percent, developments 
in wages continue to be conducive to the ECB’s 
goal of attaining price level stability this year 








6 Outlook:  Capacity  Utilization 
Increases Gradually 
Leading indicators suggest that economic activ-
ity in the euro area will be moderate in the first 
half of 2005 (Figure 4). The industrial sentiment 
indicator compiled by the European Commission 
declined during the past month and consumer 
confidence is still at a low level (Figure 1). In 
the first half of this year, real GDP is expected to 
increase more slowly than potential output. 
Domestic demand will expand only modestly 
due to the dampening effects of the rise in oil 
prices (Figure 5). Private households are likely 
to increase their consumption at a slow pace in 
view of their uncertain income situation. Export 
growth will also be moderate. Due to the past 
appreciation of the euro, the continuous expan-
sion  of  the  world  economy  will  not  lead to  a  15 
Figure 4:  




















Euro bill.   Percentb 





aSeasonally adjusted. — bAnnualized quarterly rate of change in percent. — cPercentage change over previous year.   
— dForecast starting in 2005 I. 
Source: Eurostat (2005); own forecast. 
Figure 5:  
GDP, Domestic Demand, and Net Exports in Eurolanda,
 1992–2006 
 












aAt constant prices. — bPercentage change over previous year. — cChange of net exports over previous year in percent of 
GDP in the corresponding quarter of previous year. — dForecast starting in 2005 I. 
Source: Eurostat (2005); own forecasts. 16 
Table 6:  
Quarterly Data on the Economic Development in Euroland, 2004–2006 
 2004  2005  2006 
   I   II   III   IVa   I b   IIb   IIIb   IVb   I b   IIb   IIIb   IVb 
Gross domestic productc 3.0  1.9  1.0  0.6  1.7  1.3  1.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.1 
Domestic demandc 1.3  1.2  3.8  1.3  1.5  1.0  1.3 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.1 1.9 
Private consumptionc 3.1  0.2  0.3  1.8  1.1  1.1  1.2 1.3 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.8 
Public consumptionc 0.9  1.6  1.5  0.7  1.5  1.3  1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 
Fixed investmentc –0.4  1.9  2.6  2.4  1.7  2.1  2.1 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.0 2.9 
Change in stocksd –0.5  0.4  2.6  –0.4  0.2  –0.3  –0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Net exportsd 1.6  0.7  –2.6  –0.7  0.2  0.3  0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Exportsc,e 5.7  11.4  5.2  1.9  1.5  3.5  4.3 4.5 4.5 5.3 5.1 5.4 
Importsc,e 1.5  10.1  13.1  3.9  1.1  2.9  3.4 3.9 4.3 5.0 4.8 4.9 
Unemployment ratef 8.9  8.8  8.8  8.8  8.8  8.8  8.8 8.7 8.6 8.5 8.4 8.3 
Consumer prices (HICP)g 1.7  2.3  2.2  2.3  2.0  1.8  1.7 1.5 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 
Money stock M3c 4.5  4.9  7.9  7.3  5.0  5.0  5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
3-month money market rate  2.1  2.1  2.1 2.2  2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.6 
Long-term interest rate  4.1  4.2  4.1  3.8 3.6  3.8  3.9  4.0 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 
US dollar/euro exchange rate  1.25  1.20 1.22 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30
Real effective exchange rateh 106.1  103.7  104.5  107.1 106.2  106.2  106.2 106.2 106.2 106.2 106.2 106.2 
aPartly estimated. — bForecast. — cAnnualized percentage change over previous quarter. — dContribution to change in 
GDP, in percentage points. — eIncluding intra-Euroland trade. — fPercent of the labor force, according to the ILO concept. 
— gPercentage change over previous year. — hBroad group. Based on the consumer price index. Index 1999 I = 100. 
Source: Eurostat (2005); ECB (2005b); OECD (2004b); own calculations and forecasts. 
Table 7: 
Real GDP, Consumer Prices, and Unemployment Rate in Euroland, 2003–2006 
GDPb Consumer  pricesb,c Unemployment  rated   Weightsa
2003 2004e 2005f 2006f 2003 2004e 2005f 2006f 2003 2004e 2005f 2006f 
Germany  29.3 –0.1 1.6 0.6 1.3 1.1 1.7 1.3 1.1  9.1  9.5  9.4  9.2 
France  21.4  0.5 2.3 1.7 2.3 2.2 2.3  1.6  2.3 9.5 9.6 9.5 9.0 
Italy  17.9  0.4 1.1 1.0 2.0 2.8 2.3  1.7  2.0 8.4 8.0 8.1 7.9 
Spain  10.3  2.5 2.7 2.4 3.0 3.2 3.0 2.6 2.8 11.3 10.8 10.3  9.9 
Netherlands 6.3  –0.9  1.3  1.2  2.1  2.2 1.4 1.4 1.7  3.7  4.7  4.7  4.1 
Belgium  3.7  1.3 2.7 2.2 2.5 1.5 1.9 1.6 1.9  7.9  7.8  8.0  7.7 
Austria  3.1  0.8 2.1 2.3 2.5 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.2  4.3  4.5  4.4  4.0 
Finland  2.0  2.5 3.4 2.9 3.5 1.3 0.2 0.7 1.6  9.0  8.9  8.6  8.1 
Greece  2.1  4.3 3.9 2.8 3.8 3.4 3.0 3.5 3.2  9.7 10.3  9.5  9.3 
Portugal  1.8 –1.2 1.1 1.4 2.6 3.3 2.5 1.8 2.4  6.2  6.7  6.6  6.1 
Ireland  1.9  3.7 5.7 4.3 5.4 4.0 2.3  1.9  3.0 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.0 
Luxembourg  0.3  2.1 4.4 3.4 3.3 2.6 3.2 2.3 2.8  3.7  4.2  3.8  3.5 
Euroland 100.0  0.5  2.0  1.4  2.0 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.9  8.7g 8.8g 8.6g 8.3g
aBased on nominal GDP of 2003. — bPercentage change over previous year. — cHarmonized Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP). — dStandardized unemployment rates according to the ILO concept. — ePartly estimated. — fForecast. — gBased 
on the number of employees in 2003. 
Source: ECB (2005b); OECD (2004a); own calculations and forecasts. 17 
strong increase in exports. In the second half 
of    this year, economic activity will gradually 
strengthen, one reason being that the dampening 
impact of higher oil prices will fade. The expan-
sion of private investment is likely to accelerate 
on the back of improved sales and profits ex-
pectations given that financing conditions con-
tinue to be favorable. With income perspectives 
starting to improve, consumption expenditures 
should pick up (Table 6). The expansion of ex-
ports will remain modest; while the pace of 
worldwide economic activity loses momentum, 
the dampening effects of the euro appreciation 
will fade. Real GDP is expected to increase by 
1.4 percent this year on average (Table 7). The 
unemployment rate will decline only slightly. 
Next year, the recovery will strengthen fur-
ther. On the one hand the dampening impact of 
the rise in oil prices and the appreciation of the 
euro will disappear, on the other hand the stance 
of monetary policy continues to be expansion-
ary. With increasing capacity utilization and im-
proving profitability, corporate investment will 
gain momentum. Private consumption is ex-
pected to support domestic demand increasingly 
reflecting brightened income prospects. Under 
the assumption of an unchanged real effective 
exchange rate, exports are likely to accelerate 
against the background of a faster pace of world-
wide economic activity. All in all, real GDP will 
increase by 2.0 percent. The unemployment rate 
will decline to 8.3 percent in 2006 on average 
(Table 7). 
The increase in consumer prices is likely to 
slow down in 2005, with low capacity utilization 
and declining energy prices. Next year, firm’s 
scope for raising prices will increase gradually 
due to the acceleration of economic activity. The 
ECB is likely to raise interest rates slightly to 
prevent an increase in inflationary expectations. 
In 2005, the HICP will increase by 1.8 percent, 







Appendix: The Role of Confidence 
Indicators in Short-Run Forecasts of 
Economic Activity in the Euro Area 
Leading indicators play a major role in fore-
casting economic activity in the short run. 
National accounts data are usually available only 
with a publication lag of two months, and lead-
ing indicators can inform about the develop-
ments in these two months. Moreover, leading 
indicators often contain additional information 
on the future development of economic activity. 
Among the leading indicators, confidence indi-
cators play a prominent role. They will be ana-
lyzed here with respect to the euro area.  
In the EU, industrial and consumer confidence 
indicators are published by the European Com-
mission, which has commissioned national in-
stitutions to compile them. The indicators are 
made available in a timely fashion; for the cur-
rent month they are collected in the middle of 
the month and published at its end. Indicators for 
a particular quarter are published at the end of 
that quarter, whereas GDP data are only pub-
lished two months later.  
For the analysis we use quarterly data for the 
euro area.13 The reference series is real GDP. 
Figure 6 shows the reference series (change over 
the previous year) and the indicators since 1971 
or 1973. Obviously, there is a close relationship 
between GDP growth and the levels of the indi-
cators.  
This impression is confirmed by the calcula-
tion of cross-correlation coefficients between the 
growth rate of GDP (year over year) and the in-
dicators for leads of up to four quarters and lags 
of up to two quarters. The upper part of Table 8 
shows the correlations for the full sample of 
1971(1973)–2004. The lower part of the table 
shows the correlations for the period 1993–2004.  
____________________ 
13 Historical series for the indicators are available for the 
euro area back until 1985. We extended industrial confi-
dence back to 1967 and consumer confidence back to 1973 
by aggregating national indicators for Germany, France, 
Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands (from 1971 onwards). 
We also extended the reference series back to 1970 using 
the data of Fagan et al. (2005). 18 
Figure 6:  
Confidence Indicators and Real GDP in the Euro Area, 1971–2005 




































Balance of indicator 
GDPa 
    Consumer confidence (right scale) 
 
aYear-over-year change in percent. 
Source: European Commission (2005); Fagan et al. (2005); own calculations. 
Table 8: 
Relationship between Confidence Indicators and the Year-on-Year Change in Real GDP: Cross-Correlation 
Coefficients for Various Leads and Lags 
Lead of indicators (quarters)a  4 3 2 1 0  –1  –2 
  1971–2004 
Industrial confidence  0.17  0.38 0.59 0.72 0.74 0.62 0.41 
Consumer confidenceb  0.28 0.40 0.51 0.60 0.67 0.63 0.54 
  1993–2004 
Industrial confidence  0.07  0.35 0.63 0.82 0.88 0.66 0.39 
Consumer confidence  0.51  0.67 0.78 0.82 0.79 0.57 0.32 
aNegative sign: lag. — b1973–2004. 
Source: European Commission (2005); own calculations. 19 
Table 9: 
Relationship between Confidence Indicators and the Quarter-to-Quarter Change in Real GDP: Cross-Correlation 
Coefficients for Various Leads and Lags 
Lead of indicators (quarters)a  4 3 2 1 0  –1  –2 
  1971–2004 
Industrial confidence  0.35  0.51 0.57 0.55 0.39 0.18  –0.01 
Consumer confidenceb  0.30 0.38 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.33  0.21 
  1993–2004 
Industrial confidence  0.30  0.51 0.62 0.62 0.49 0.14  –0.07 
Consumer confidence  0.50  0.56 0.58 0.53 0.41 0.13  –0.06 
aNegative sign: lag. — b1973–2004. 
Source: European Commission (2005); own calculations. 
Comparing the two periods serves to check 
the stability of the relationships. We find that, 
independent from the sample period, the highest 
correlation occurs contemporaneously. However, 
the differences are not large when looking at a 
lead of one quarter. With 0.7, the correlations are 
quite high in the full sample period. In the period 
since 1993, they are even higher by 0.1; in this 
sample, the correlation coefficient for consumer 
confidence is relatively high even for a lead of 
two quarters.  
The correlations are much smaller when the 
reference is the change in real GDP against the 
previous quarter (Table 9), and the lead/lag re-
lationships are different, too. For industrial con-
fidence, the maximum is now at a lead of 1–2 
quarters, though at lower correlation coefficients 
of only 0.57 (1971–2004) and 0.62 (1993–2004). 
For consumer confidence, significant differences 
between the two sample periods can be ob-
served. Over the whole sample the maximum 
lead is zero to one quarter, with a correlation co-
efficient of 0.45, in the 1993–2004 sample the 
lead is 2 to 3 quarters with a correlation of 0.58 
and 0.56, respectively. Overall, there is a close 
relationship between the indicators and the busi-
ness cycle with some lead of the indicators. The 
relationship seems to have become closer in re-
cent years. 
Further, we want to investigate by how much 
the confidence indicators can contribute to low-
ering the forecast error of a quantitative forecast 
model. The starting point is a forecast model that 
in the first step forecasts the change in real GDP 
against the previous quarter, ∆y, as a function of 
the contemporaneous indicator I by using the re-
gression equation  
(1)   ∑∑
==










1 1 ∆ ∆ ε β α . 
Here, α and β are the parameters to be esti-
mated, ε is an error term, and D is a vector of 
deterministic variables such as a constant, a 
trend or dummy variables. The first step, thus, 
exploits the publication lead of the indicator.  
In the second step, ∆y is forecast using the 
one-quarter lagged indicator, using a regression 
equation of the form 
(2)   ∑∑
==










2 2 ∆ ∆ ε β α . 
Now, the forecast lead of the indicator is ex-
ploited. Additional forecast steps using this ap-
proach would require a relationship between ∆y 
and  I lagged by two quarters, which however, 
turned out to be insignificant. Alternatively, one 
can use a model that represents the indicator as 
depending on its own past value and on ∆y: 





l t l k t k t D I y I 3 3
11
∆ ε µ δ + + + = ∑∑
==
− − . 
Here, δ and µ are, again, parameters to be es-
timated. Using (3) in conjunction with (1) or (2), 
we can calculate many forecast steps for ∆y and 
I. For the first 8 steps, the forecast performance 
of the complete model is now compared to a 
model that does not use the information of the 
confidence indicators; for simplicity we choose 
an autoregressive model for ∆y.  20 
We use both industrial confidence and con-
sumer confidence simultaneously. We find a 
significant contemporaneous relationship with 
GDP growth for both indicators. In addition, we 
find industrial confidence in the United States, 
as represented by the purchasing managers’ in-
dex (ISM), significant in explaining business 
confidence in the euro area. Overall, we thus 
have a vector autoregressive model (VAR) with 
4 variables. The empirical specification of this 
model follows the specification procedure out-
lined in Benner und Meier (2004) and Borbély 
and Meier (2005).  
We analyze the historical forecast perform-
ance over the period of 1988Q1–2004Q4. The 
performance measure is the root mean squared 
forecast error (RMSE). The parameters of the 
models are reestimated before each forecast 
step  using only the data available at that time. 
Figure  7 shows the forecasts of the indicator-
based model compared to the reference series for 
different forecast horizons. Obviously, the one-
step forecasts are relatively close to the original 
series, while for more than one step the forecasts 
are more far off. Table 10 shows the RMSE of 
the indicator-based model and of the autore-
gressive model for forecasts of the quarter-to-
quarter changes in real GDP at annual rates. For 
the first forecast step, the forecast error of the 
indicator-based model is significantly lower than 
that of the autoregressive model. For the second 
forecast step, the indicator-based model’s RMSE 
is still lower than that of the autoregressive 
model; the difference is, however, not significant 
at conventional significance levels. From the 
third forecast step on, the autoregressive model 
has a lower RMSE; there is, thus, no information 
to be exploited in the vector autoregressive 
model.  
Figure 7:  
Real GDP and Forecasts of the Indicator-Based Model for Different Forecast Horizons, 1988–2004 



































aQuarter-over-quarter at annual rate in percent. 
Source: Eurostat (2005); own calculations. 21 
Table 10: 
Forecast Errors of the Indicator-Based Model and the AR Modela 
Forecast  steps  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Indicator-based model  1.2*  1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
AR model  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
*Significant at 10 percent according to the test of Diebold und Mariano (1995).  
aMeasure: Root mean squared forecast error (RMSE). 
Source: Own calculations. 
All in all, the analysis shows that confidence 
indicators contain important information for 
forecasts of real GDP growth in the euro area. 
Most importantly, they are published with a lead 
with respect to the national accounts data. While 
they serve to improve short-run forecasts of 
GDP, short-run forecast errors will remain high 
even if one uses the information contained in the 
indicators. For the annualized quarter-to-quarter 
real GDP growth in the euro area in the first 
quarter of 2005, the indicator-based model cur-
rently produces an estimate of 0.5 percent, that 
is, an increase which is as moderate as in 
the previous quarter. The confidence interval for 
this forecast at an error probability of 33 percent 
(1 standard error) lies between –0.6 and 1.7 per-
cent. Our forecast, which takes into account ad-
ditional information from other leading indica-
tors, economic considerations as well as special 
effects such as the problems associated with 
trading-day adjustment in Germany, lies in the 
upper part of the confidence interval of the indi-
cator-based model. 
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